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NOTES

Treating Section 303(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code as Subject-Matter
Jurisdictional
SOUND APPROACH OR INVOLUNTARY REFLEX?
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy is typically thought of as a “last resort,”1 a
process by which debtors can obtain relief from unmanageable
debt2 and escape the incessant and distressing collection
attempts of creditors.3 Given this characterization of
bankruptcy as “relief,”4 it is not surprising that the vast
majority of bankruptcy cases are initiated by debtors, who
voluntarily accept the downsides of bankruptcy in exchange for

1

“Almost all who file for bankruptcy do so as a last resort . . . .” 151 CONG.
REC. E753, E754 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2005) (statement of Rep. McCollum). But see 151
CONG. REC. S2405, S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Frist) (“For many
people, bankruptcy has become a first step rather than a last resort.”); DAVID A. SKEEL
JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY of BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 1 (2001)
(“[I]ndividuals and businesses in the United States do not seem to view bankruptcy as
the absolute last resort . . . .”).
2
See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) (One purpose of
bankruptcy is “to give the bankrupt a fresh start.”); In re Chalasani, 92 F.3d 1300, 1304
(2d Cir. 1996) (“[O]ne of the principal purposes of the Bankruptcy Code [is] allowing
the debtor to begin a new life free from debt . . . .”).
3
See In re Meyers, 344 B.R. 61, 66-67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (“One
significant remedial purpose of a bankruptcy discharge order is to prevent the
emotionally harmful conduct associated with debt collection tactics.”); In re Gervin, 337
B.R. 854, 863 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005) (“A significant component of [bankruptcy] is
being free of the kinds of harassment, threats, and anxiety that debtors were suffering
before they filed.”).
4
See, e.g., Charles G. Hallinan, The ‘Fresh Start’ Policy in Consumer
Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49,
51 (1986) (“The central importance of debtor relief in consumer bankruptcies is a
commonplace of legal discussion.”).
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freedom from crushing financial obligations.5 In fact, in most
consumer bankruptcies, creditors have little incentive to see
their debtors file for bankruptcy, since there are usually no
assets left to distribute after state and federal exemptions are
applied to the debtor’s estate.6 The United States Bankruptcy
Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) does, however, provide a means
for creditors to force unwilling debtors into bankruptcy,7 a
potentially appealing option for a creditor who fears that the
debtor’s existing nonexempt assets will have been squandered
by the time the debtor finally files a voluntary bankruptcy
petition.8
As might be expected, however, a creditor cannot push
an unwilling debtor into bankruptcy with the relative ease with
which a debtor can do so to itself. Instead, Section 303(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides a number of requirements9 that

5

2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 303.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 15th ed. 2002); see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-110, at 2 & n.9 (2003) (“[F]ewer than 1
percent of all bankruptcy case filings are commenced involuntarily.”); Richard M.
Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 9 n.43 (2008) (“Involuntary cases are very rare.”).
6
Ed Flynn, Gordon Bermant, & Suzanne Hazard, Bankruptcy by the
Numbers: Chapter 7 Asset Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 22
(“About 96 percent of chapter 7 cases are closed without any funds collected and
distributed to creditors . . . .”); SKEEL, supra note 1, at 8 (“Although creditors can push
a debtor into bankruptcy by filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition, they have little
incentive to do so.”).
7
11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006).
8
See, e.g., Evan D. Flaschen & Carrie A. Brodzinski, Involuntary Petitions
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 547 PLI/COMM 93, 97-98 (1990) (detailing several
situations that might prompt a creditor to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition);
H.R. REP. NO. 108-110, at 2 (“[A]n involuntary bankruptcy petition can serve as a
useful creditor collection tool. For example, it can preserve assets from further
dissipation and provide for their orderly liquidation by a bankruptcy trustee, a
fiduciary charged by statute to protect such assets and maximize their value for the
benefit of creditors.”); COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 303.01 (“[T]here are certain key
situations in which the filing of an involuntary case remains a beneficial, and
sometimes optimal, choice for creditors . . . .”); In re All Media Props., Inc., 5 B.R. 126,
134 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980) (“[I]t is important that involuntary petitions be tried and
resolved promptly because if the debtor is not paying its debts as they become due,
then its creditors are entitled to the protection of their rights afforded by the Code and
to prevent the debtor from wasting its assets.”).
9
11 U.S.C. § 303(b). This provision provides in relevant part:
An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title—
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is . . . a holder of a claim against
such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide
dispute as to liability or amount . . . if such noncontingent, undisputed claims
aggregate at least [$13,475] more than the value of any lien on property of
the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of such claims; [or]
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must be met in order for relief to be entered in an involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding.10 The majority of courts and
commentators have interpreted these requirements as prima
facie elements of an involuntary bankruptcy case, which must
be either disputed or waived by the debtor.11 However, in In re
BDC 56,12 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals joined the
minority of jurisdictions and interpreted certain of these
requirements as being subject-matter jurisdictional in nature,13
meaning that they pertain to “the courts’ statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”14 The Second
Circuit based its position on the argument that creditors
should be forced to prove the sufficiency of the involuntary
petition “at the earliest practicable point.”15 This Note argues
that the Second Circuit’s treatment of the Section 303(b)
requirements as subject-matter jurisdictional is contradictory
to the provision’s implied goals of fairness and judicial
efficiency, and is inconsistent with the jurisdictional structure
of the United States bankruptcy system.
Part I of this Note surveys the history of the
Bankruptcy Code, focusing on the origins and development of
federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. It details the
jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy system, laying a

(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders . . . by one or more of such holders
that hold in the aggregate at least $10,000 of such claims . . . .
Id.
10

Note that in the context of an involuntary bankruptcy, a debtor who
opposes the petition is seeking dismissal rather than relief. See In re Alta Title Co., 55
B.R. 133, 135-36 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (“An involuntary petition must end either in
the entry of an order for relief against the debtor or dismissal of the creditors’
petition.”).
11
See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101
(11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases and authority supporting this proposition), overruled
by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
12
In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
13
Id. at 118. In fact, although the Second Circuit shares its position with a
small number of bankruptcy courts in other circuits, it is the only circuit court to have
explicitly adopted this holding. See, e.g., In re Paczesny, 283 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2002) (“The absence of a bona fide dispute [as required by § 303(b)] is a
jurisdictional prerequisite.”); In re New Mexico Props., Inc., 18 B.R. 936, 939-40
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (describing § 303(b) as a “[jurisdictional] hurdle for petitioning
creditors to overcome”). The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits are the only other circuits to
have explicitly ruled on this issue, both concluding that § 303(b) is not subject-matter
jurisdictional in nature. In re Trusted Net Media, 550 F.3d at 1046; In re Rubin, 769
F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1985).
14
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see infra
Part III.A.1 (describing the basic principles of subject matter jurisdiction).
15
In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d at 118.
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foundation for the argument that the Section 303(b)
requirements do not pertain to the bankruptcy courts’
jurisdiction. Part II investigates the Section 303(b) circuit split,
examining three cases in which courts have justified their
treatment of the Section 303(b) requirements either as subjectmatter jurisdictional or as “substantive matters which must be
proved or waived for petitioning creditors to prevail in
involuntary proceedings.”16 Part III assesses the various
rationales for, and implications of, both sides of the circuit split
and contends that the Second Circuit’s approach to the Section
303(b) requirements is inconsistent with the jurisdictional
structure of the Bankruptcy Code, wastes judicial resources,
and therefore should be abandoned. This section highlights two
recent cases, one from the United States Supreme Court17 and
another from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of
New York,18 both of which cast doubt on the Second Circuit’s
treatment of Section 303(b) as subject-matter jurisdictional and
indicate that BDC should no longer be upheld as good law. This
Note concludes that the Second Circuit should resolve the
circuit split in favor of treating Section 303(b) as substantive,
and not subject-matter jurisdictional, in nature.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN BANKRUPTCY CODE

In order to appreciate the merits and weaknesses of the
arguments on either side of the Section 303(b) circuit split, it is
first necessary to understand the overall structure of the
Bankruptcy Code, including the role of involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings and the rationale behind the modern jurisdictional
structure of the U.S. bankruptcy system. Involuntary
bankruptcy cases, though far less common today than they
were at the inception of our nation’s bankruptcy laws,19 were
always within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.20 While
16

In re Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
18
In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
19
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 8 (“Under current law, the vast majority of debtors
file for bankruptcy voluntarily . . . . In the nineteenth century, by contrast, involuntary
bankruptcy figured quite prominently.”); supra note 5 (discussing infrequency of
involuntary bankruptcy petitions today).
20
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 27 (“By 1867, it was evident that Congress could
enact both voluntary and involuntary laws . . . [which] were administered through the
federal district courts.”); David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical
Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of
Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and its Judicial Officers, 9 J. BANKR. L. &
17
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the jurisdictional structure of bankruptcy courts is quite
different today, its evolution has been shaped by the desire to
make the bankruptcy process as fair, efficient, and costeffective as possible.21 In order to further these objectives,
Section 303(b) must be interpreted as substantive rather than
jurisdictional because this approach better comports with the
statutory structure of the bankruptcy system, creates greater
predictability, and leads to more efficient resolution of
bankruptcy cases.
A.

Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Roots of Modern U.S.
Bankruptcy Law

The English bankruptcy laws, from which our modern
bankruptcy system evolved, were in fact remarkably different
from the scheme that the United States has in place today.22
Most notably, the first English bankruptcy statutes, enacted
under Henry VIII in 1582, treated the debtor as a criminal, did
not release the debtor from debts remaining after liquidation
and distribution, and could only be invoked on the initiative of
the creditors.23 Although later versions of English bankruptcy
law decriminalized the proceedings and provided for discharge
of unsatisfied obligations,24 the process remained one that was
commenced by creditors against potentially unwilling debtors.25
In other words, the only bankruptcy proceeding available was
involuntary.26
With little debate or fanfare, the Founding Fathers
granted to Congress the constitutional power to pass
bankruptcy laws.27 When Congress passed the first federal
PRAC. 165, 170-71 (2000) (the first Bankruptcy Act of the United States provided for
only involuntary bankruptcy cases, and gave district courts jurisdiction to appoint
“non-judicial, bankruptcy ‘commissioners’ to assist in administering proceedings under
this Act”).
21
The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to “secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
22
Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does
That Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 281-82 (explaining that “American social, economic,
and philosophical influences modified English tradition to create American bankruptcy
law”).
23
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 169.
24
Id. at 169-70.
25
See id. at 169-70.
26
Id. at 169.
27
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to pass “uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies”); Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy:
Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605, 608
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bankruptcy statute in 1800, it adopted the creditor-friendly
involuntary approach used in England.28 However, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was soon repealed and it was not until
two more failed attempts by Congress that a workable
bankruptcy system emerged in 1898.29 The intervening years
witnessed a continuous struggle between debtors and creditors
to shape the law in their respective favor.30 But by 1898, it
became evident that debtors had definitively won the battle for
voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, which first appeared in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 and have remained a fixture of United
States bankruptcy law ever since.31 Nevertheless, the 1898
Bankruptcy Act still included provisions for involuntary
bankruptcy petitions,32 which remain substantially unchanged
to this day.33

(2008) (this constitutional provision was drafted “with surprisingly little debate”);
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 23 (the provision was included “almost as an afterthought . . .
and it was approved with little debate”).
28
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 25; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 170-71.
29
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 171-75 (“[The 1898] Act formed the
basis of our modern bankruptcy laws.”).
30
DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE
RISK MANAGER 136-37 (2004); Krieger, supra note 22, at 293 (“Until the middle of the
nineteenth century, bankruptcy law was decidedly pro-creditor. Since then it has
oscillated between provisions favoring debtors and those favoring creditors, depending
on economic and political pressures at a given time.”).
31
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 171-75; MOSS, supra note 30, at 136-38.
32
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 59, 30 Stat. 544, 561-62 (1898) (repealed
1978). The provision governing involuntary cases under this Act stated:
[t]hree or more creditors who have provable claims against any person which
amount in the aggregate, in excess of the value of securities held by them, if
any, to five hundred dollars or over; or if all of the creditors of such persons
are less than twelve in number, then one of such creditors whose claim equals
such amount may file a petition to have him adjudged a bankrupt. . . . If it be
averred in the petition that the creditors of the bankrupt are less than twelve
in number, and less than three creditors have joined as petitioners therein,
and the answer avers the existence of a larger number of creditors, there
shall be filed with the answer a list under oath of all the creditors, with their
addresses, and thereupon the court shall cause all such creditors to be
notified of the pendency of such petition and shall delay the hearing upon
such petition for a reasonable time, to the end that parties in interest shall
have an opportunity to be heard . . . .
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 59(b), (d).
33
Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 59(b) (requirements for creditors to file
an involuntary bankruptcy petition), with 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), (c) (2006), and FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1003(b) (same).
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Development of the Present-Day Jurisdictional Structure
of the Bankruptcy Code

The 1898 Bankruptcy Act remained in place until the
passage of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted after
lengthy studies by both the Brookings Institution34 and the
congressionally established Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States.35 By 1970, it had become apparent
that in addition to being outdated in a variety of respects, the
1898 Act caused confusion and inefficiency in bankruptcy suits
because of serious jurisdictional deficiencies.36 In particular,
bankruptcy court jurisdiction under the 1898 Act was limited
to the bankruptcy proceeding itself plus a narrow class of
controversies that arose during the course of the bankruptcy
proceeding.37 All other disputes that arose during the case had
to be litigated separately in either state or federal district
court.38 The resulting “bifurcated jurisdiction” led to great
expense and delay due to both the “threshold jurisdictional
litigation” as well as the practical inconvenience of litigating in
multiple forums.39 The 1978 Bankruptcy Code sought to remedy
34

Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 177. “The Brookings Institution is a
nonprofit public policy organization based in Washington, D.C. . . [whose] mission is to
conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide
innovative, practical recommendations [to] [s]trengthen American democracy; [f]oster
the economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans and [s]ecure
a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.” Brookings
Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
35
Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 638 (2002) (“Congress established [the
Commission] in 1970 . . . to ‘study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes’ in the
Bankruptcy Act. The ensuing report and hearings ultimately led to the passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting COMM’N ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R.
DOC. NO. 137 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part I, at 1-2 (1973)); Kennedy & Clift, supra note
20, at 177.
36
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 177, 188. The term “jurisdiction” in this
discussion, and in this Note generally, relates to subject matter jurisdiction rather than
personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is relatively easy to obtain in bankruptcy
proceedings, at least where the defendant is located in the United States, because the
bankruptcy courts can effect nationwide service of process. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004;
Leonard Gerson, Class Proofs of Claim and Class Actions in Bankruptcy: Clarifying the
Law, Improving the Process, and Expanding the Use of Class Actions, 17 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 6 Art. 2, at n.208 (“[C]ourts . . . have determined that the minimum contacts
required for a bankruptcy court to have personal jurisdiction over an entity is satisfied
by the entity’s presence in the U.S. as a whole rather than in any particular state.”).
37
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 187.
38
Id. at 187-88.
39
Id. at 188; Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction: A General Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
743, 792 (2000) (“The primary vice of the 1898 Act’s jurisdictional regime was that it
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this shortcoming by granting expansive subject matter
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.40 Thus, the Code created
independent bankruptcy courts that were instructed to exercise
“original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11”
and “original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to
cases under title 11.”41
Within four years, however, this broad jurisdictional
grant to bankruptcy courts failed a constitutional challenge in
the United States Supreme Court.42 In 1982, the Supreme
Court in Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipeline
Company held that the jurisdictional grant of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional because it allowed nonArticle III judges43 to adjudicate matters governed by state law
that were merely “related to” a bankruptcy case.44 Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion explained that Article III of the
United States Constitution was designed to ensure the
separation of powers and to protect the independence of the
judiciary.45 While Congress has the authority to assign certain
judicial functions to non-Article III “adjunct tribunals,”46 the
engendered an excessive amount of preliminary litigation over jurisdictional issues
surrounding the bifurcation of bankruptcy jurisdiction.”).
40
Brubaker, supra note 39, at 791; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 188;
see also In re Hospitality Ventures/LaVista, 358 B.R. 462, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007)
(“One of [the] primary objectives [of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978] was to expand
bankruptcy jurisdiction and eliminate disputes over what bankruptcy judges could
hear in order to avoid costly and time-consuming arguments over jurisdiction.”).
41
28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1471 (Supp. III 1980).
42
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50,
50 (1982).
43
Id. at 61 (“[T]here is no doubt that the bankruptcy judges created by the
[1978] Act are not Art. III judges.”).
44
Id. at 88; 1 HON. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON, III,
NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:24 (3d ed. 2009); THOMAS J. SALERNO &
JORDAN A. KROOP, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION AND PRACTICE § 3.05 (2006) (“The
Supreme Court’s principal concern was that bankruptcy judges, who were appointed
for fixed terms and had salaries subject to reduction by Congress, had jurisdiction
under the law to hear and decide all matters, even those based solely on state law and
having only a tangential nexus to the bankruptcy estate.”).
45
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57-60. The bulk of this protection comes
from the fact that Art. III judges are given life-tenure and guaranteed a nondiminishing salary, thus ensuring that concerns about their compensation do not color
their judgment. Id. at 59; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Under the 1978 Act, bankruptcy
judges served only 14-year terms, they were subject to removal for “incompetency,
misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability,” 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1978),
and were not provided a guaranteed salary. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53.
46
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 77, 80-82. “The [1978] Act designate[d] the
bankruptcy court in each district as an ‘adjunct’ to the district court.” Id. at 63 n.13
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976)).
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1978 Act vested bankruptcy judges with all the “‘essential
attributes’ of the judicial power of the United States.”47 Finding
that this broad jurisdictional grant exceeded “Congress’ power
to create adjuncts to Art. III courts,” a plurality of the Court
held that the jurisdictional provision of the 1978 Act was
unconstitutional.48
In order to keep the bankruptcy system afloat, the
federal courts adopted the “Emergency Rule,” which was
effectively a return to bifurcated jurisdiction.49 When Congress
finally passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, it essentially maintained this bifurcated
approach.50 Under the act, Congress granted jurisdiction over
bankruptcy proceedings to the federal district courts via 28
U.S.C. § 1334.51 It also designated bankruptcy courts as “unit[s]
of the district court[s]”52 and authorized district courts to refer
Title 11 cases to the bankruptcy court in their judicial districts
via 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).53 As a result of the 1984 Code’s
demarcation between “core” and “non-core” (or “related to”)
proceedings,54 an approach that was adopted in order to
implement the lessons learned in Marathon Pipeline,
bifurcated jurisdiction became entrenched.55 Core proceedings
are those matters having a sufficiently close nexus to the
pending bankruptcy so as to make final determination by the
bankruptcy court proper.56 Non-core matters, on the other hand,
cannot be finally determined by the bankruptcy court without
the consent of the affected parties.57 Without such consent, the
bankruptcy court can only make a recommendation, which
47

Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 87.
49
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 189-90.
50
Id. at 190-91 (“Broadly and briefly stated, another bifurcated jurisdictional
approach was adopted by Congress in the 1984 amendments.”).
51
The statute provides in relevant part that “the district courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)
(1982).
52
Id. § 151.
53
This provision states that “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all
cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the
district.” Id. § 157(a).
54
Id. § 157; Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 191-92; 1 NORTON & NORTON,
supra note 44, at §§ 4:10 & 4:28.
55
Kennedy & Clift, supra note 20, at 180, 191.
56
1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:28 (“A nonexhaustive listing of
‘core’ proceedings is set forth in 28 [U.S.C.] § 157(b)(2).”).
57
Id.
48
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must go up to the district court for entry of a final order.58
Moreover, Congress mandated that, upon timely motion of a
party, federal courts must abstain from hearing a state law
claim that could not have otherwise been commenced in the
federal court had it not been introduced in a bankruptcy
proceeding.59 This jurisdictional structure has been preserved
through subsequent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and
is still in effect today.60
While numerous disputes as to the proper scope of
bankruptcy jurisdiction remain,61 two observations emerge that
are relevant to the analysis of Section 303(b). First, the
Bankruptcy Code is divided, both conceptually and
organizationally, into separate substantive and jurisdictional
sections, with the substantive sections establishing the various
types of bankruptcy cases available62 and the jurisdictional
provisions granting district courts and bankruptcy courts the
authority to hear those cases.63 It has never been doubted that
involuntary bankruptcy cases, like any other bankruptcy
proceeding, are “cases under title 11” for the purposes of
Congress’ grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts.64 Thus, to the extent that the provisions of Title 11 are

58
59

Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(2), 157 (2006); SALERNO & KROOP, supra note 44, at

§ 3.10[B].
60

1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:10.
See, e.g., Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: Nationwide
Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 37, 54 & n.85 (2008) (pointing out disagreement between circuit courts as
to whether a bankruptcy court may retain “their ‘related to’ jurisdiction . . . after the
bankruptcy has been dismissed”); Radha A. Pathak, Breaking the “Unbreakable Rule”:
Federal Court, Article I, and the Problem of “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 85
OR. L. REV. 59, 61 (2006) (“The United States Supreme Court appears to have accepted
the constitutionality of ‘related to’ bankruptcy jurisdiction, but it has never explicitly
articulated the constitutional basis for such jurisdiction.”); 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra
note 44, at § 4:63 (identifying “split of authority on whether a particular type of
proceeding is ‘core’ or ‘related to’” the bankruptcy case).
62
The substantive provisions reside in Title 11. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. Ch. 7
(concerning liquidation cases); 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11 (concerning reorganization cases); 11
U.S.C. Ch. 13 (concerning adjustment cases).
63
The jurisdictional provisions reside in Title 28. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 &
1334.
64
28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334; see also In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC,
550 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As a class of cases, involuntary bankruptcy
cases unquestionably arise under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code), and thus fall within
the congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts.”); In re
Bowshier, 313 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004) (“There is no dispute that
bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.”).
61
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construed as substantive in nature, Section 303 should be
similarly interpreted.65
Second, while bankruptcy jurisdiction is notoriously
complex,66 this complexity stems more from the constitutional
uncertainty surrounding the broad congressional grant of
jurisdiction to non-Article III judges67 than from any significant
disagreement as to the finer contours of bankruptcy court
jurisdiction. The area of greatest uncertainty in the context of
this jurisdiction relates to the bankruptcy courts’ ability to
entertain cases and proceedings other than the bankruptcy
case itself.68 While this issue is just as likely to arise in the
context of an involuntary bankruptcy as in a debtor-initiated
bankruptcy, the issue of whether Section 303(b) relates to
subject matter jurisdiction is largely unrelated to this
particular area of uncertainty. Rather, it has more to do with
general notions of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory
construction. Consequently, despite falling within the broader
and more complex realm of bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the
question of how to best interpret Section 303(b) can be
addressed using the same rules of statutory analysis as are
used in other contexts.
II.

THREE CASES ADDRESSING THE SECTION 303(b)
REQUIREMENTS

Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that an
involuntary petition be brought by creditors holding claims
that “aggregate at least [$13,475]”69 and that are “not
contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute as
65

An involuntary bankruptcy does not, in fact, arise under its own distinct
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, but rather is a bankruptcy case of the type established
by 11 U.S.C. Ch. 7 or 11 U.S.C. Ch. 11. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“An involuntary case may be
commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title . . . .”). Thus, § 303 is best viewed as
supplementing those substantive provisions that establish liquidation and
reorganization cases, so as to allow for their commencement by a creditor as opposed to
the debtor.
66
See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 39, at 746 (“[T]he jurisdiction in bankruptcy
remains one of the most enduring puzzles of our federal court system.”); Lipson, supra
note 27, at 645 (“At least as a conceptual matter, bankruptcy jurisdiction is
exceedingly—perhaps needlessly—complex . . . .”).
67
See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 27, at 645-46.
68
See supra note 61.
69
11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006). This amount was increased from $5,000 to
$10,000 in 1994, and the Bankruptcy Code requires that as of 1998, automatic
adjustments take place every three years. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103394, § 108(b)(1) (Oct. 22, 1994); 11 U.S.C. § 104; 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44,
at § 22:7.

876

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

to liability or amount.”70 Moreover, if the debtor has more than
twelve creditors, the petition cannot be brought by fewer than
three of those creditors.71 Few courts have bothered to perform
a rigorous analysis of how to best characterize the Section
303(b) requirements, either because the procedural postures of
the involuntary cases before them have not required it,72 or
because they simply chose to apply a precedent that mandated
a particular conclusion.73 Nevertheless, those courts that have
addressed this issue have reached conflicting results, with the
overwhelming majority of them finding that the Section 303(b)
requirements are not subject-matter jurisdictional but rather
substantive, as recently held by the Eleventh Circuit in In re

70

11 U.S.C. § 303(b). The noncontingency requirement prevents claimholders from being counted toward the requisite number of petitioning creditors if their
claims are dependent on the occurrence of a future uncertain event, such as “the
liability of a guarantor when the principal has not defaulted.” 2 NORTON & NORTON,
supra note 44, at § 22:3. The undisputed claim requirement is meant to keep creditors
from forcing a debtor into bankruptcy when there is a “legitimate disagreement over
whether money is owed, or, in certain cases, how much.” In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc.,
277 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004). It “prevent[s] creditors from using the bankruptcy
courts as a club in collecting claims that [are] disputed, although not contingent.” 2
NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 22:3. Although the phrase “bona fide dispute” is
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, the circuit courts have defined it as “an objective
basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.” In re Byrd,
357 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Matter of Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir.
1987)). “The bankruptcy court need not resolve the merits of the bona fide dispute, but
simply determine whether one exists.” Id.(citation omitted).
71
11 U.S.C. § 303(b).
72
An involuntary bankruptcy petition is often “timely controverted” by the
debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 303(h), in which case the characterization of § 303(b) as substantive
or jurisdictional loses its significance because there is no longer any question of the
debtor’s possible waiver of the § 303(b) requirements as a defense. See, e.g., In re Reg’l
Anesthesia Assocs. PC, 360 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing
involuntary petition due to “bona fide dispute” after debtor timely controverted the
petition); In re Euro-American Lodging Corp., 357 B.R. 700, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(ordering relief against involuntary debtor who filed a timely answer because
petitioning creditor adequately demonstrated that the petition satisfied the § 303(b)
requirements).
73
See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101 n.5
(11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases in which courts concluded that § 303(b) is subjectmatter jurisdictional without providing an explanation of why they did so), overruled
by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re Quality Laser Works, 211 B.R. 936,
941 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (stating simply that “[i]t is well settled that the filing of an
involuntary petition invokes the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court if
the petition is sufficient on its face and contains the essential allegations”); In re Taylor
& Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing precedent from
other bankruptcy courts and secondary authorities to conclude that “Courts have long
recognized that the elements of Bankruptcy Code 303(b) are not prerequisites to
establishing a bankruptcy court’s subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings arising
from an involuntary petition”).
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Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC.74 This part summarizes
three cases in which courts have provided rationales for their
differing conclusions. First, it looks at In re Rubin,75 in which
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 303(b) is not
jurisdictional. Next, it presents In re BDC 56 LLC,76 in which
the Second Circuit held that Section 303(b) is subject-matter
jurisdictional. Finally, it examines In re Trusted Net Media
Holdings,77 in which the Eleventh Circuit recognized the circuit
split, performed a thoughtful analysis of both sides, and
overruled an earlier case to hold that Section 303(b) does not
pertain to subject matter jurisdiction.
A.

The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis in In re Rubin

In re Rubin78 came before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals shortly after Congress passed the 1984 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code,79 which added to Section 303 the new
requirement that petitioning creditors’ claims in an
involuntary bankruptcy case not be “the subject of a bona fide
dispute.”80 The debtor in the case, Rubin, submitted to the
bankruptcy court a timely answer to an involuntary petition
filed by ten creditors, in which he asserted that the claims
alleged by the petitioning creditors were contingent and that
the petition was filed in bad faith.81 A protracted and extensive
discovery process ensued, during which the debtor repeatedly
postponed depositions, produced thirty-three boxes of allegedly
“disorganized and nonsensical” documents, and provided
schedules of disputed claims that the bankruptcy court
74

In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1041 (11th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (stating that “[m]ost other courts to consider the issue likewise have
concluded that § 303(b)’s filing requirements are not subject matter jurisdictional,” and
listing relevant cases).
75
769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985).
76
330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
77
550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruling 525 F.3d 1095 (11th
Cir. 2008).
78
769 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1985).
79
See supra Part I.B (chronicling the development of the Bankruptcy Code).
80
Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 & n.2; Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 426(b), 98 Stat. 333, 369 (1984).
81
In re Rubin, 37 B.R. 232, 233 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984). At the time that Rubin
filed his answer with the bankruptcy court in 1982, the new bona fide dispute provision
was not yet in effect. Id. at 232 (decided on February 29, 1984); Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 369,
392 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (2006)) (“The amendments made [to
§ 303(b)] shall become effective upon the date of enactment of this Act[, July 10,
1984].”).
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repeatedly found “insufficient.”82 As a result, the bankruptcy
court imposed sanctions on Rubin, “striking Rubin’s answer
and entering an order for relief.”83 The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed this order, and Rubin further appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.84
In his appearance before the Ninth Circuit, Rubin
argued for the first time that the new “bona fide dispute”
provision of the Bankruptcy Code was a jurisdictional
requirement of an involuntary proceeding, and that his case
should therefore be remanded to the bankruptcy court for a
determination as to whether it had subject matter jurisdiction.85
Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately did reverse and remand
for a trial on the sufficiency of the involuntary petition, it did
so based on a finding that the bankruptcy court’s discovery
sanctions were an abuse of discretion—not on the jurisdictional
basis that Rubin asserted.86 Nevertheless, the court did engage
in a jurisdictional analysis in order to establish its authority to
reach the abuse of discretion issue.87 The Ninth Circuit held
that the undisputed-claims requirement of Section 303(b) was
not jurisdictional in nature, but rather went “to the merits—an
element that must be established to sustain an involuntary
proceeding.”88 In so doing, the court analogized this
requirement to others in Section 303, which had been labeled
as “jurisdictional” in prior cases, but were in fact treated as
“substantive matters which must be proved or waived.”89 The
82

Rubin, 769 F.2d at 613.
Id.
84
Id. at 613-14.
85
Id. at 614. The bona fide dispute provisions became effective after the
proceedings in the bankruptcy court but before those in the Ninth Circuit. See supra
note 81.
86
Rubin, 769 F.2d at 619.
87
Id. at 614-15. The circuit court held that the bankruptcy court had
jurisdiction independent of § 303(b), and that “[t]he bankruptcy court’s order striking
Rubin’s answer and entering an order for relief was a final decision,” and thus that the
circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to hear this case. Id. at 615.
88
Id. at 614-15.
89
Id. at 614 n.3. In In re Mason, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state
that the § 303(b) requirements were not jurisdictional in nature, but it did hold that
the petition’s failure to meet one of those requirements “did not deprive the bankruptcy
court of jurisdiction to enter a valid order for relief,” when the debtor “waived his right
to present this defense by failing to raise it in an answer to the petition.” 709 F.2d
1313, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1983). In In re Visioneering Construction, a case similar to
Rubin involving a debtor that allegedly obstructed discovery proceedings, the court
held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions on
the debtor by striking the debtor’s answer and ordering relief against the debtor. 661
F.2d 119, 123-24 (9th Cir. 1981). Discovery in that case was intended to help the
83
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court also suggested that the nature of subject matter
jurisdiction is such that a failure to satisfy the Section 303(b)
requirements could not deprive the bankruptcy court of its
already-existing power to hear the case.90
B.

The Second Circuit’s Analysis in In re BDC 56 LLC

In In re BDC 56 LLC,91 the debtor, owner of the
Chambers Hotel in Manhattan, successfully moved for
dismissal of an involuntary petition filed by three construction
companies that claimed to be owed money for work performed
on the hotel.92 The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition
based on BDC’s assertion that two of the creditors’ claims were
subject to bona fide disputes93 and that the third lacked

bankruptcy court determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the case.
Visioneering, 661 F.2d at 121. As a result of striking the debtor’s answer, the
bankruptcy court treated the allegations in the petition as admitted by the debtor, and
found that those allegations “were sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.
at 122. The Rubin court, in its analysis of Visioneering, observed that the notion of
“conferring subject matter jurisdiction” by admission of the parties is entirely
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that “parties cannot confer subject
matter jurisdiction on a federal court by their consent.” Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3
(quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982)). Thus, despite the use of the term “subject matter jurisdiction” in Mason
and Visioneering, the Rubin court held that those cases did not in fact establish that
the § 303(b) requirements were anything other than “substantive matters which must
be proved or waived.” Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 n.3.
90
Rubin, 769 F.2d at 614 (“Subject matter jurisdiction deals with a court’s
competence to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong and the power to deal with the general subject involved in the
action.”). The court cited In re Earl’s Tire Service, Inc., in which a nonpetitioning
creditor sought to have an involuntary petition against its debtor dismissed in order to
prevent the trustee from voiding the creditor’s collection activities. Id. (citing In re
Earl’s Tire Serv., Inc., 6 B.R. 1019, 1020 (D. Del. 1980)). In order to get around its lack
of standing to object to the petition, the creditor in Earl characterized its objection that
there were an insufficient number of petitioning creditors as an attack on the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Earl, 6 B.R. at 1021. The Earl court observed that, since
“Earl’s Tire was qualified to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, it is difficult to
perceive how an arguable defect in the procedural mechanism for commencing a
bankruptcy action would deprive the court of its subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at
1022. It went on to warn that courts’ sometimes inaccurate use of the word
“jurisdictional” does not provide a basis for “‘jurisdictional’ challenges raised by
disgruntled creditors.” Id. at 1023.
91
330 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2003).
92
Id. at 114.
93
Id. at 115 (debtor had “a longstanding dispute with [the first creditor]
concerning its performance under the contract,” and “contended that [the second
creditor’s] right to payment had not yet arisen under its contract”); see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(b); supra note 70.
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standing.94 After the creditors moved unsuccessfully for
reconsideration and lost an appeal in the district court, they
appealed to the Second Circuit.95 At the circuit court, the
parties argued for different standards of review-with BDC
seeking review for “clear error” and the creditor-appellants
urging “de novo review.”96 Instead, the Second Circuit construed
the
Section
303(b)
requirements
as
subject-matter
jurisdictional and therefore applied plenary review.97 In support
of its holding that the Section 303(b) requirements were
jurisdictional, the court stated that “[w]hether an alleged
debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an
involuntary case is a threshold determination that should be
made at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.”98 The
court cautioned that a result of failing to treat Section 303(b) as
subject-matter jurisdictional would be that “creditors could, on
the basis of relatively untested claims, haul a solvent debtor
with whom they have legitimate disputes into bankruptcy court
and force it to defend an involuntary proceeding while the
bankruptcy court leaves for later merits determination whether
the debtor is even properly before it.”99 In addition to its own
analysis, the court also relied on two previous holdings within
the Second Circuit in which the courts repeatedly referred to
Section 303(b) challenges as “jurisdictional.”100
94

BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 115 (the third creditor was a subcontractor of another
party with whom debtor had contracted directly and to whom debtor had tendered
complete payment).
95
Id. at 116.
96
Id. at 118.
97
“When reviewing a district court’s determination of its subject matter
jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”
Id. at 119 (quoting In re Vogel Van & Storage, Inc., 59 F.3d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1995)); see
also Zappia Middle East Constr. Co. v. Emirate of Abu Dhabi, 215 F.3d 247, 249 (2d
Cir. 2000) (per curium).
98
BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118.
99
Id. at 118-19.
100
In re Elsa Designs, Ltd., 155 B.R. 859, 863 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating
that the undisputed-claim requirement of § 303(b) “is both an element of the condition
upon which a controverted order for relief may be entered and a necessary prerequisite
for the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction”); In re Onyx Telecomm., Ltd., 60 B.R. 492, 495
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that in a 12(b)(1) facial attack on an involuntary
bankruptcy petition, “Section 303(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code is the applicable
jurisdictional provision”). These cases do not explain the reasoning behind their
conclusions that § 303(b) is jurisdictional. However, it is clear from both cases’ detailed
discussions of the § 303(b) challenges that the court was indeed analyzing these
challenges as subject-matter jurisdictional, and not merely making a careless “drive-by
jurisdictional ruling[].” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)); Elsa, 155 B.R. at 863,
864 n.2; Onyx, 60 B.R. at 493-97 (discussing at great length the difference between a
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The Eleventh Circuit Addresses the Split in In re
Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC

In 2008, in In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC,101
the Eleventh Circuit convened en banc to rehear an appeal
from the lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an
involuntary bankruptcy petition.102 An involuntary Chapter 7
petition was filed in 2002 by a single creditor of Trusted Net.103
After the debtor failed to respond, the bankruptcy court
entered an order for relief.104 Two years later, David W.
Huffman, an officer of Trusted Net, moved to dismiss the
petition on the basis that the single-creditor petition failed to
meet the Section 303(b) requirements for subject matter
jurisdiction because the claim was subject to a bona fide
dispute and the debtor had twelve or more creditors.105
Although the bankruptcy court denied this motion, no appeal
was taken.106 Two more years passed, at which point a number
of Trusted Net’s creditors reached a settlement with the
trustee.107 Huffman, whose deferred salary also made him a
creditor of Trusted Net,108 was not included in the settlement
agreement and his objections to the settlement were overruled
by the bankruptcy court.109 Huffman then filed another motion
to dismiss the case, in which he raised the same argument that
he raised in 2004—namely, the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction due to the use of a disputed claim and an
insufficient number of petitioning creditors.110 In denying the
motion, the bankruptcy court ruled that the requirements of
Section 303(b) were not subject-matter jurisdictional and that
the objection to the petition, raised more than four years after
the commencement of the proceeding, had been waived by the

facial attack and a factual attack under 12(b)(1) before applying legal principles to the
facts of that case).
101
550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
102
Id. at 1037-38.
103
Id. at 1037.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1037-38.
106
Id. at 1038.
107
Id.
108
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1097 (11th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
109
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1038 (11th Cir.
2008) (en banc).
110
Id.
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debtor.111 When the district court affirmed, Trusted Net
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit solely on the basis that the
“requirements in Section 303(b) are jurisdictional, and thus
cannot be waived.”112 Despite concluding that Section 303(b) is
properly construed as substantive rather than jurisdictional in
nature, the Eleventh Circuit, found itself to be bound by
contrary precedent.113 Consequently, with more than a bit of
hesitation, the court reversed the lower court’s denial of
Trusted Net’s motion to dismiss;114 however, the court
subsequently vacated its decision115 and convened en banc to
rehear the appeal.116
On rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit undertook a
systematic analysis of the issue, looking not only at the
“statutory framework for bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the
commencement of involuntary bankruptcy cases,” but also the
split between the Ninth and the Second Circuits.117 In its
decision, the court concluded that Section 303(b) should not be
treated as subject-matter jurisdictional for four main reasons:
(1) there is no indication in the language of the provision that
Congress intended to condition the court’s jurisdiction on
satisfaction of the Section 303(b) requirements;118 (2) other
111

Id.
Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1097.
113
Id. at 1107 (finding itself bound by the precedent of In re All Media Prop.,
Inc., 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’g 5 B.R. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980)). In All
Media, the former Fifth Circuit analyzed § 303 in one of the first cases to apply the
then-new Bankruptcy Code in an involuntary proceeding. All Media, 5 B.R. at 131.
Rather than explicitly stating that § 303(b) was jurisdictional, the All Media court
made repeated reference to it as such. Id. at 133, 134, 138, 140, 142 (referring to
various subsections of § 303 as jurisdictional). The Trusted Net court found that this
treatment nevertheless qualified as a holding, because “a determination that § 303(b)
is subject matter jurisdictional was a necessary predicate for the court’s consideration
of [the debtor’s] argument-which was raised neither in the pleadings nor at trial-that
the creditor . . . did not satisfy the statutory requirement of having an unsecured or
undersecured claim.” Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1106-07.
114
Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1107.
115
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 530 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2008).
116
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (“Because this Court sitting en banc is not bound by prior decisions of a
panel of this Court or its predecessor, we need not revisit All Media. Instead, we reach
our own conclusions as to the proper interpretation of § 303(b).” (internal citation
omitted)).
117
Id. at 1038.
118
The court stated that “the language of § 303(b) does not evince a
congressional intent to implicate the bankruptcy courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.”
Id. at 1043. This conclusion was based, in part, on the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. See infra Part III.A.3. The Trusted Net court also noted that
not only is there “no indication from the text of § 303 that Congress intended
bankruptcy courts to consider sua sponte at any point in the proceedings whether the
112
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similar provisions of the Bankruptcy Code have been
interpreted as substantive rather than as jurisdictional;119 (3)
this conclusion is consistent with “the bankruptcy-related
jurisdictional grant in Title 28, as well as the basic nature of
subject matter jurisdiction[;]”120 and (4) this conclusion is
consistent with the other provisions of Section 303.121 After the
Eleventh Circuit’s en banc holding in Trusted Net, the Second
Circuit stands alone in treating Section 303(b) as subjectmatter jurisdictional in nature.122
III.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT ERRED IN FINDING SECTION 303(b)
JURISDICTIONAL

The Section 303(b) requirements are best viewed as
substantive rather than subject-matter jurisdictional. First,
treating the Section 303(b) requirements as substantive better
comports with the “basic nature of subject matter
jurisdiction,”123 the specific jurisdictional structure of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the language and purpose of Section 303
itself. Additionally, the 2006 United States Supreme Court
case, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., definitively resolves this issue
by establishing a test for determining whether a statute is
jurisdictional or substantive in nature.124 Second, a comparison
between Section 303 and analogous provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code that have been treated as either substantive
or jurisdictional demonstrates that Section 303(b) should also
be construed as nonjurisdictional for the sake of consistency.
Third, the Second Circuit’s treatment of Section 303(b) as
jurisdictional actually undercuts the court’s implied goals of
fairness and judicial efficiency. In fact, a subsequent case

involuntary petition filing requirements have been met,” but that “the statutory
language strongly suggests the opposite.” Trusted Net, 550 F.3d at 1044.
119
“[T]his Court has interpreted similar ‘commencement of the case’ language,
found elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code, to be non-jurisdictional.” Trusted Net, 550
F.3d at 1043.
120
Id. at 1044.
121
Id. at 1044-45 (referring to § 303(c), (h)).
122
See supra note 13.
123
Id. at 1044.
124
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006) (holding that a
statutory requirement should be treated as subject-matter jurisdictional only when
Congress evinces a clear intent to make it so, and relying also in part on questions of
fairness and judicial efficiency).
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within the Second Circuit125 demonstrates that the circuit’s
jurisdictional treatment of Section 303(b) is unworkable.
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Code:
Does Section 303 Belong?

Treating Section 303(b) as jurisdictional conflicts with
general notions of subject matter jurisdiction as well as the
specific jurisdictional structure of the Bankruptcy Code, and
prevents the other provisions of Section 303 from operating as
Congress intended. Furthermore, this interpretation is a direct
violation of the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corporation.126
1. The Nature of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Its
Place in the Bankruptcy Code
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to “the courts’
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”127
Because it goes to the fundamental ability of a court to
entertain and adjudicate a proceeding, it is never too late to
raise an objection based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
even if the issue has not been introduced until appeal.128
Nothing that the parties do in the course of litigation can serve
to create jurisdiction that would otherwise be lacking.129 A lack
125

In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
127
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (internal
citation omitted) (emphasis in original); In re Rubin, 769 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1985)
(“Subject matter jurisdiction deals with a court’s competence to hear and determine
cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and the power to
deal with the general subject involved in the action.” (internal citation omitted));
Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547-48 (2008) (“[Subject matter jurisdiction] can
broadly be defined as the court’s raw, baseline power and legitimate authority to hear
and resolve the legal and factual issues in a class of cases.”).
128
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) & 12(h); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“The objection
that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by
a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the
entry of judgment.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,
455 (2004) (“A litigant generally may raise a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
at any time in the same civil action, even initially at the highest appellate instance.”
(internal citations omitted)). But see Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 n.9 (“Even subjectmatter jurisdiction, however, cannot be attacked collaterally”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982) (listing the few circumstances in which subject matter
jurisdiction may be attacked post-judgment).
129
Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456 (“Characteristically, a court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct . . . .”); Ins.
126

2010] TREATING § 303(b) AS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTIONAL

885

of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by any party or the
court sua sponte.130 Once a federal court is found to lack subject
matter jurisdiction, it is not within the court’s discretion to
retain the case.131
Like all federal courts, bankruptcy courts have limited
subject matter jurisdiction,132 the scope and extent of which is
defined by Congress.133 It is well-established that Congress
defined the subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts in
sections 1334 and 157 of Title 28.134 These sections provide that

Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“[N]o
action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.”).
130
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3) (“When it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action.”); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506 (“The objection that a federal
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction . . . may be raised by a party, or by a court on its
own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
judgment.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 953
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the hoariest precepts in our federal judicial
system is that a claim going to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any point in the litigation by any party.”) (emphasis added).
131
Compagnie des Bauxite, 456 U.S. at 702 (“‘[T]he rule, springing from the
nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without
exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in
the exercise if its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all
cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record.’” (quoting
Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); Morrison v. Allstate
Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[L]ower federal courts are
empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a congressional grant of
jurisdiction, and once a court determines that there has been no grant that covers a
particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.” (internal citation omitted))). Moreover, the question of whether subject
matter jurisdiction is available is one for the court, and not a jury. 13 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (2008); Wasserman, supra note 127, at 1547-48
(“[T]he court resolves any factual issues on which jurisdiction turns.”).
132
Morrison, 228 F.3d at 1260-61.
133
Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (“Only the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court
created by the general government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of
Congress.”); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334 (2006).
134
Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-53 (“Only Congress may determine a lower
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction . . . . Congress did so with respect to
bankruptcy courts in Title 28 . . . .”) (citation omitted); In re Banks, 235 Fed. Appx. 943,
944 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157, provide the source of a
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); Valley Historic Ltd. P’ship v. Bank
of New York, 486 F.3d 831, 839 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Whether a bankruptcy court may
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a proceeding is determined by reference to 28
U.S.C. § 1334.”); In re U.S. Brass Corp., 301 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 2002) (“The source
of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 . . . .”) (quoting
United States Tr. v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 216 B.R. 764, 769 (W.D. Pa.
1997), aff’d, 166 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1999)); 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:4
(“The present Bankruptcy Code does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, which is
established solely by provisions of Title 28.”); see also supra Part I.B.
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bankruptcy courts may exercise jurisdiction over “any or all
cases under title 11,” pursuant to referral from the district
court.135 In contrast to the jurisdictional provisions of Title 28,
Title 11 “contains the body of substantive law governing the
federal bankruptcy regime.”136 The practical effect of this
statutory structure is that a bankruptcy court unquestionably
has the jurisdiction to entertain an involuntary bankruptcy
case, which by definition falls under Title 11.137 In the course of
exercising that jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court’s task is to
determine whether the substantive requirements for
bankruptcy relief are satisfied. The question of whether the
substantive requirements of Title 11 are satisfied does not, in
any case, affect the threshold determination that the court has
the jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case.138 The mere
reference to Title 11 in the statutory provision that establishes
bankruptcy jurisdiction139 is not a ground for translating all of
Title 11’s substantive requirements into jurisdictional
requirements.140
Given this jurisdictional and statutory framework, it is
more sensible to conclude that Section 303(b) is unrelated to
135

28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
Pathak, supra note 61, at 66 & n.21. Cf. In re Trusted Net Media Holdings,
LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1098 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing Chapter 7, which defines
liquidation, as the substantive provisions, and Chapter 3, which contains § 303, as “the
procedural statute at issue”); see also supra Part I.B.
137
28 U.S.C. §§ 157 & 1334; 11 U.S.C. § 303; In re Trusted Net Media
Holdings, LLC, No. 07-13429, 2008 WL 5069824, at *8 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2008) (“As a
class of cases, involuntary bankruptcy cases unquestionably arise under Title 11 . . . .”).
138
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). In Bell, the Supreme Court stated:
136

Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could
actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause
of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of
jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action in which relief
could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact it must be
decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the
controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that
the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then
dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction.
Bell, 327 U.S. at 682.
139
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (“[T]he district courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.”); 28 U.S.C § 157(a) (“Each district
court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings
arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to
the bankruptcy judges for the district.”).
140
See, e.g., In re Bowshier, 313 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2004) (“[I]t is
important to note that not every statutory requirement is a matter of jurisdiction.”).
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subject matter jurisdiction. First, Section 303(b) is codified
within Title 11, which contains the substantive body of
bankruptcy law, rather than in Title 28, which is the
jurisdictional grant to federal courts.141 Second, Section 303
makes no reference to jurisdictional requirements.142 Third,
treating Section 303(b) as jurisdictional could lead to the
illogical result of incentivizing an involuntary debtor’s
default.143 Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a
single creditor files an involuntary bankruptcy petition against
a debtor with more than twelve qualified creditors. If the
debtor files an answer asserting that the petition fails to satisfy
Section 303(b), he will then be required to supply the
petitioning creditor with a list of his creditors’ names and
addresses and a description of their claims, in order for notice
to be sent.144 This allows the petitioning creditor to alert the
other claimholders to the involuntary petition and gives those
creditors an opportunity to join the petition with the same
effect as if they were original petitioning creditors.145 More
likely than not, the requisite number of creditors will join the
petition to ensure that they receive some part of the
distribution of assets, and the debtor will lose his Section
303(b) jurisdictional defense.
Now consider a situation in which the same debtor fails
to file a timely answer to the petition. Akin to a default
judgment in a civil case,146 if the debtor does not answer, the
court must allow the bankruptcy case to proceed pursuant to
141

11 U.S.C. § 303(b); see supra notes 62-63.
11 U.S.C. § 303; In re Trusted Net Media Holding, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102
(11th Cir. 2008) (“Section 303(b) does not contain any explicit reference to its
requirements being jurisdictional in nature.”); cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 502, 516 (2006) (holding that the employee-numerosity requirement of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) is not jurisdictional, in part because “the 15-employee threshold appears in
a . . . provision that ‘does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the district courts.’”) (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).
143
Admittedly, treating § 303(b) as substantive could lead to the undesirable
result of allowing a creditor to force a debtor into bankruptcy on the basis of a single
claim that would be better resolved through state collection procedures, or on the basis
of a disputed claim. See infra Part III.C.2. However, this result is consistent with the
judicial policy that a litigant’s default may work to its detriment, and is more sensible
than the alternative. Id.
144
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b).
145
11 U.S.C. § 303(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1003(b) and advisory committee note
(d). This arrangement is sensible given that the debtor is the party with the most
knowledge about his or her own financial affairs. See In re Coppertone Commc’ns, Inc.,
96 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
146
See FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
142
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Section 303(h).147 However, if Section 303(b) is treated as
subject-matter jurisdictional, a default would actually be in the
debtor’s best interest since he could then move to dismiss the
petition after the court has entered relief against him—still
early enough to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a
defense but too late for additional creditors to join the
petition.148 In order to incentivize full disclosure by the debtor,
it makes far more sense to treat the requirement of three or
more petitioning creditors as a waivable affirmative defense,
i.e., substantive rather than jurisdictional.149 Under this
approach, a debtor that fails to disclose the existence of
claimholders gives up his Section 303(b) defense150 and may be
left with undischargeable debts if his creditors are not notified
of the bankruptcy.151
2. A Non-Jurisdictional Interpretation Ensures that
Section 303 Operates Effectively
When examined in conjunction with the other
subsections of Section 303, it is plain that Section 303(b) must
be treated as nonjurisdictional in order for the statute to
operate sensibly.152 First, not only does a jurisdictional reading
147

11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (“If the petition is not timely controverted, the court
shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under
which the petition was filed.”); 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 22:12.
148
See 11 U.S.C. § 303(c) (“After the filing of a petition under this section but
before the case is dismissed or relief is ordered, a creditor . . . may join in the petition
with the same effect as if such joining creditor were a petitioning creditor . . . .”)
(emphasis added). Moreover, while bankruptcy courts have broad powers to remedy
bad faith conduct by litigants, see 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); 2 NORTON & NORTON, supra note
44, at § 13:4, they cannot use their equitable powers to expand the scope of their
jurisdiction. 1 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 4:5 (“The grant of equitable
power to a bankruptcy court does not create, confer, or supply subject-matter
jurisdiction if it is otherwise lacking.”). Thus, if § 303(b) was jurisdictional, the
bankruptcy court would be unable to rely on its equitable powers to allow joinder of
creditors after the entry of relief, as this would amount to a unilateral expansion of its
jurisdiction. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (explaining that bankruptcy
courts cannot use the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to expand the scope of
their jurisdiction); In re Granger Garage, Inc., 921 F.2d 74, 77 (6th Cir. 1990)
(“[Section] 105(a) [is not a] jurisdictional provision[]. The subject matter jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court is limited to that which congress specifically grants.”).
149
In re Coppertone Commc’ns, Inc. 96 B.R. 233, 236 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989).
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., 3 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 44, at § 57:20 (“Under Code
§ 523(a)(3), creditors who are neither listed by the debtor in the schedule of creditors
filed with the court, nor who have otherwise learned of the bankruptcy case within a
limited period of time, may have their claims excepted from discharge.”).
152
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Interpreting § 303(b) as non-jurisdictional . . . results in a harmonious
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of Section 303(b) incentivize a debtor’s default when combined
with Section 303(c),153 but it also causes Section 303(c) to
operate in contradiction of the general principles of subject
matter jurisdiction.154 If the bankruptcy court were to allow a
nonpetitioning creditor to “join in the petition with the same
effect as if such joining creditor were a petitioning creditor
under [Section 303(b)],”155 it would essentially be acting so as to
confer jurisdiction upon itself, thus violating a rule that the
Supreme Court has described as “inflexible.”156 By contrast, if a
Section 303(b) defect is merely a substantive failure, then
permitting a creditor to join the petition would effectuate
Section 303(c) while adhering to the rules of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Next, a jurisdictional reading of Section 303(b) would
also cause Section 303(d) to violate general principles of subject
matter jurisdiction. Section 303(d)’s limitation on who may file
an answer to an involuntary petition157 has been interpreted as
an exhaustive list.158 This list indicates that creditors, including
operation of the statutory subsections.”), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
153
See supra Part III.A.1.
154
See id. (discussing general principles of subject matter jurisdiction); In re
Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1044-45 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“[I]t seems anomalous at best to conclude that a bankruptcy court, which lacks
jurisdiction over an involuntary case because the petition was defectively filed,
subsequently may create jurisdiction for itself by permitting additional creditors to join
the petition [under § 303(c)].”).
155
11 U.S.C. § 303(c).
156
Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982) (“‘[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of
the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its
own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise if its appellate power, that of
all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not
affirmatively appear in the record.’”) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)); Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th
Cir. 2000) (“[L]ower federal courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there
has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction, and once a court determines that there
has been no grant that covers a particular case, the court’s sole remaining act is to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”).
157
11 U.S.C. § 303(d) (“The debtor, or a general partner in a partnership
debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an answer to a petition under this
section.”).
158
See, e.g., FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(a), (e) (“The debtor named in an
involuntary petition . . . may contest the petition. . . . No other pleadings shall be
permitted . . . .”); In re MarketXT Holdings Corp., 347 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006) (interpreting § 303(d) to mean that “only ‘[t]he debtor, or a general partner in a
partnership debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an answer”) (emphasis
added); In re Taylor & Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 378-79, 381 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1996) (this rule “prohibit[s] creditors from contesting an involuntary petition in order
to prevent creditors from protecting a preference or retaining some other unfair
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petitioning creditors who are undoubtedly parties to the
litigation, are not authorized to raise objections to an
involuntary petition based on a Section 303(b) deficiency.159 It is
fundamental, however, that any party may raise an objection
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.160 Thus, if Section
303(b) is jurisdictional in nature, one of the most basic and
longstanding features of subject matter jurisdiction would not
apply. Rather than creating an unprecedented exception to the
well-accepted principles of subject matter jurisdiction, the more
logical approach is to interpret Section 303(b) in a manner that
is consistent with both the principles of subject matter
jurisdiction and the statutory structure to which Section 303(b)
belongs.161 This approach leads to the conclusion that Section
303(b) is nonjurisdictional.
3. Distinguishing Jurisdictional and Substantive
Statutory Provisions Under Arbaugh: Is the Split
Over Section 303(b) Moot?
Part of the difficulty in characterizing any statutory
provision as jurisdictional or substantive stems from the
frequent and longstanding misuse of the word “jurisdiction” by
courts.162 In 2006, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,163 when the Court faced the question of
whether an employee-numerosity requirement in Title VII was
advantage”); In re Westerleigh Development Corp., 141 B.R. 38, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); In
re New Era Co., 115 B.R. 41, 44-45 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (listing cases in support of
this proposition).
159
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011. The rationale for this rule is that “a creditor may
have an incentive to protect a preference or to gain some unfair advantage at the
expense of other creditors, contrary to the policy of requiring an equitable distribution
of the debtor’s assets among all creditors.” New Era, 115 B.R. at 45.
160
See supra note 130.
161
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Interpreting § 303(b) as non-jurisdictional, on the other hand, results in a
harmonious operation of the statutory subsections.”).
162
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (“Courts, including this Court,
it is true, have been less than meticulous in this regard; they have more than
occasionally used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in
rules of court.”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998)
(“‘Jurisdiction,’ it has been observed, ‘is a word of many, too many, meanings . . . .’”); Da
Silva v. Kinsho Intern. Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Court decisions often
obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing for ‘lack of jurisdiction’ when
some threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether
the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a
claim.”); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1990) (“As for ‘jurisdiction’:
the word is a many-hued term . . . .”).
163
546 U.S. 500 (2006).
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subject-matter jurisdictional or substantive.164 In Arbaugh, the
plaintiff brought a Title VII suit against her employer alleging
sexual harassment.165 Two weeks after the trial court entered
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant moved to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that the word
“employer,” as defined under Title VII, included only those
people who have “fifteen or more employees.”166 The defendant
asserted that he employed fewer than fifteen people and,
therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over the case.167 In its
decision, the Supreme Court held that courts should construe
statutory requirements as nonjurisdictional unless Congress
makes it clear that the requirement is intended to function as a
jurisdictional limitation.168 The Court also addressed the
tendency of lower courts to carelessly label dismissals as
“jurisdictional” when they were in fact based on a party’s
failure to establish a substantive element of its claim,169 and
characterized “such unrefined dispositions as ‘drive-by
jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no precedential
effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority
to adjudicate the claim in suit.”170 In addition to the main
legislative intent test, the Arbaugh Court also mentioned the
“‘unfair[ness]’ and ‘waste of judicial resources’” that would
result from construing the employee numerosity requirement
as jurisdictional, as factors in its decision.171
When the Eleventh Circuit first addressed the question
of how to characterize Section 303(b) in Trusted Net, it held
that it was not governed by Arbaugh.172 The original Trusted
Net court found that because All Media explicitly treated
164
165
166
167
168

Id. at 503.
Id. at 503-04.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503-04.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 509, 515-16. The Arbaugh Court stated:

If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s
scope shall count as jurisdictional, the courts and litigants will be duly
instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. . . . But when
Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.
Id. at 515-16. The Court also provided a nonexhaustive list of statutes in which
Congress clearly stated its intent that a requirement be jurisdictional. Id. at 516 n.11.
169
Id. at 511.
170
Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
171
Id. at 515.
172
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1104 n.11 (11th
Cir. 2008), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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Section 303(b) as jurisdictional, as opposed to simply labeling it
as such, the decision was not a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling”173
and therefore must be treated as binding precedent.174 When
the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reheard Trusted Net en
banc, however, it overruled All Media after applying the
Arbaugh factors and finding that the Section 303(b)
requirements are in fact not subject-matter jurisdictional.175
Consistent with the main test articulated in Arbaugh, the en
banc panel focused primarily on the failure of Section 303(b) to
“speak in jurisdictional terms.”176 Although the Trusted Net
court did not address the question of “‘unfair[ness]’ and ‘waste
of judicial resources,’”177 such considerations would have also
militated in favor of its conclusion.178 Indeed, a jurisdictional
reading of Section 303(b) would allow the debtor to
strategically default so as to prevent the petitioning creditors
from curing a defective petition,179 a blatantly unfair strategy. It
would also allow creditors to squirrel away jurisdictional
objections to be used in the event that the involuntary
bankruptcy case does not appear to be progressing in their
favor,180 thus wasting the court’s time and depleting the debtor’s
estate.181 In the face of Trusted Net’s well-reasoned application
of Arbaugh and the fairness and efficiency considerations

173

Id.; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91.
Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1104 n.11. In fact, this panel could have overruled
the All Media precedent without having to convene en banc. Id. at 1104 n.7 (“We
have . . . held that when an earlier panel of this court has adopted a lower court’s order,
that order is binding precedent unless and until overruled by the Supreme Court or this
Court sitting en banc.”) (first emphasis added). While the Supreme Court did not
expressly hold that § 303(b) was nonjurisdictional, it did issue a clear directive to
courts that, “when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.”
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
175
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (11th Cir.
2008) (en banc). “Applying the Supreme Court’s . . . recent Arbaugh test, § 303(b)’s
requirements are not subject matter jurisdictional,” because “the language of § 303(b)
does not evince a congressional intent to implicate the bankruptcy courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1046.
176
Trusted Net, 550 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515).
177
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.
178
The emphasis on efficiency, demonstrated in FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001, also
applies in the context of involuntary bankruptcy cases. See supra note 21; FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1013 (“The court shall determine the issues of a contested [involuntary]
petition at the earliest practicable time . . . .”).
179
See supra Part III.A.1.
180
See supra notes 158-159.
181
11 U.S.C. § 503 (providing for certain bankruptcy related expenses to be
paid out of the debtor’s estate).
174
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suggested by the Arbaugh Court, the Second Circuit’s position
is now even more tenuous.
B.

Analogous Provisions in the Bankruptcy Code

Like Section 303(b), other provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code have been the subject of debate regarding whether they
are jurisdictional or substantive in nature. Significantly, most
of these provisions have been deemed to be nonjurisdictional. A
brief look at the rationales provided for some of these
provisions suggests that the debate over Section 303(b) should
be similarly resolved.182
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) and 549(d): Time Limit on
Adversary Proceedings
Sections 546(a) and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code
establish a time limit after which a trustee can no longer bring
certain adversary proceedings to recover property of the
debtor’s estate that has been transferred away.183 In In re Pugh,
the Eleventh Circuit held that these sections were not
jurisdictional, but rather waivable statutes of limitations.184 In
Pugh, the debtors did not raise the untimeliness of the trustee’s
adversary proceeding in their response since they asserted that
it was jurisdictional and therefore could be raised at any time.185
In refuting this interpretation, the court relied on the “plain
language of the provisions themselves,” the overall statutory
182

Cf. Wasserman, supra note 127, at 1547-49 (“[I]f only some jurisdictional
grants are bound up with the merits, there is no explanation or justification for why
some merits issues should be jurisdictional and others not.”).
183
11 U.S.C. §§ 546(a) & 549(d). The trustee’s ability to void transfers of a
debtor’s property is referred to as his “avoiding power.” See, e.g., 1 NORTON & NORTON,
supra note 44, at § 3:11. The trustee uses this power in order to maximize the value of
the debtor’s estate for distribution to creditors, and to prevent preferential treatment of
favored creditors. Id. at § 22:12.
184
In re Pugh, 158 F.3d 530, 530 (11th Cir. 1998). The court characterized the
issue in this case as
whether these code provisions constitute grants of subject matter jurisdiction
that leave a court without any authority to hear certain proceedings-i.e., that
extinguish the right of action itself by divesting a court of its subject matter
jurisdiction over certain proceedings-after the limitations period has elapsed,
or whether they are true statutes of limitations that restrict the power of a
court to grant certain remedies in a proceeding over which it has subject
matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 533-34.
185
Id. at 532.
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scheme, decisions of other courts, and the legislative history in
concluding that the limitations were not jurisdictional in
nature.186 In its rejection of the alternative view, the Pugh court
noted that the key precedent in support of that approach was
“devoid of analysis”187 and relied on the faulty assumption that
a limitation on a cause of action is automatically a limitation
on a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that cause of
action.188 As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Trusted Net, “[t]he
reasons in Pugh apply equally to Section 303(b).”189
2. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e): Limits on Amount of Debt to
Qualify for Chapter 13 Relief
Under Section 109(e), the Code places a statutory cap on
the amount of debt an individual can owe and still be a
Chapter 13 debtor.190 In Rudd v. Laughlin,191 the bankruptcy
trustee alleged that the debtors had abused the bankruptcy
system by filing six Chapter 13 petitions in a six-year period,
despite their inability to qualify as Chapter 13 debtors under
Section 109(e) due to the amount of their unsecured debt.192 In
response to the trustee’s attempt to convert their case into a
186

Id. at 538. This is the majority view. See, e.g., In re Outboard Marine Corp.,
299 B.R. 488, 496 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (“The clear weight of recent authority bolsters
the conclusion that § 546(a) is [nonjurisdictional].”); In re Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc.,
294 B.R. 164, 174 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2003) (“The court finds the analysis in Pugh to be
persuasive.”); In re Rodriguez, 283 B.R. 112, 120 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Based on the
Pugh case and the decisions cited in Pugh, the Court finds that Section 546(a) is
[nonjurisdictional].”); In re Klayman, 228 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“The
case of [Pugh] . . . follows the majority view.”).
187
Pugh, 158 F.3d at 535-36 (“[T]he few other courts that have adopted this
jurisdictional view offer little analysis to support their position.”). The Eleventh Circuit
made the same observation with regard to § 303(b) in Trusted Net, where it noted that
“[a]lthough some bankruptcy courts earlier had reached the same conclusion as the
Second Circuit [in BDC], that § 303(b) is subject matter jurisdictional, they did so
without explanation.” In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1101 n.5
(11th Cir. 2008), overruled by 550 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). This pattern
lends credence to the Supreme Court’s concern over “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
188
Pugh, 158 F.3d at 535-36.
189
In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1044 (11th Cir.
2008) (en banc). Significantly, at least one bankruptcy court within the Second Circuit
has adopted Pugh’s reasoning. In re Rodriguez, 283 B.R. 112, 119-20 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2001).
190
11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The current amounts are $336,900 for unsecured debt,
and $1,010,650 for secured debt, and are subject to adjustment every three years. 11
U.S.C. §§ 104, 109(e).
191
866 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1989).
192
Id. at 1041.
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Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtors asserted that the
bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
case due to the Section 109(e) deficiency.193 When the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conversion to Chapter 7,
it agreed with the district court that the Section 109(e)
deficiency was more akin to a failure to state a claim than a
jurisdictional defect.194 The circuit court noted that the
congressional grant of subject matter jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases comes from 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157 and,
unlike the requirements for diversity jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, makes no reference to an amount in controversy.195 This
analysis applies with equal force to Section 303(b). To the
extent that the Rudd court rejected the notion that “a case filed
by an ineligible debtor is a nullity, and the court has no
jurisdiction to convert the nonexistent case to another
chapter,”196 it would be illogical to conclude that an involuntary
case filed by an insufficient number of creditors is incapable of
being cured.197 Instead, it more closely resembles a failure to
state a claim, which does not implicate subject matter
jurisdiction.198
3. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1): Credit Counseling
Requirement
Both Section 301 (governing voluntary petitions) and
Section 303 (governing involuntary petitions) state that a
bankruptcy case can only be commenced by or against one who
193

Id.
Id. at 1041-42.
195
Id. The Rudd court relied in part on a Fifth Circuit case in which the court
recognized a split in authority over whether § 109 was jurisdictional. Promenade Nat’l
Bank v. Phillips, 844 F.2d 230, 236 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit noted that
“the courts holding that the issue is not jurisdictional generally have engaged in an
analysis of the issue, while the courts holding that it is a matter of jurisdiction have
not.” Promenade, 844 F.2d at 235 n.2. Once again, the Supreme Court’s concern about
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings” appears well-founded. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006); supra
note 187.
196
Rudd, 866 F.2d at 1041.
197
At least one bankruptcy court within the Second Circuit agrees with the
reasoning in Pugh. In re Toronto, 165 B.R. 746, 756 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (“Section
109(e) relates to the eligibility of a debtor for chapter 13 relief, not the jurisdiction of
the court.”); cf. Cavaliere v. Sapir, 208 B.R. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1997) (describing
§ 109(e) as jurisdictional, though without any meaningful analysis); In re Rifkin, 124
B.R. 626, 629 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); In re Jerome, 112 B.R. 563, 564 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
198
Cf. Rudd, 866 F.2d at 1041.
194
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“may be a debtor.”199 In 2005, amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code added the requirement that an individual must receive
credit counseling within the 180 days preceding the bankruptcy
petition in order to be a debtor.200 In the context of a voluntary
Chapter 13 petition where the debtor did not complete his
credit counseling within the allotted time, one bankruptcy
court has held that it “simply lacks jurisdiction over a debtor’s
case where the debtor fails to comply with [the credit
counseling requirement].”201 For debtors facing involuntary
bankruptcy, this holding must have prompted shouts of joy—if
they simply refused credit counseling, they could not qualify as
debtors under Title 11 and the court would have to dismiss the
involuntary petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Not
surprisingly, later courts have rejected this contention both on
the basis of its sheer absurdity202 and statutory construction.203
Nonetheless, it provides a good example of a nonjurisdictional204
provision within Title 11 that cannot be logically distinguished
from the statutory requirements imposed by Section 303(b).

199

11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 303(a) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (“[A]n individual may not be a debtor under this title
unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the
petition by such individual, received . . . credit counseling . . . .”).
201
In re Giles, 361 B.R. 212, 214 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007).
202
In re Allen, 378 B.R. 151, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007) (“While the court
recognizes that § 303(a) requires that a person who is the subject of an involuntary
case qualify as a debtor, interpreting this provision as requiring that an involuntary
debtor comply with section 109(h)(1) would lead to an absurd result.”).
203
Id. at 153 (finding that because “[t]he statutory language of section
109(h)(1) requires that the credit counseling occur before ‘the filing of the petition by
such individual,’” the requirement only applied to voluntary cases) (emphasis in
original).
204
That the credit counseling requirement is unrelated to subject matter
jurisdiction is further evidenced by the fact that there are bases, albeit limited ones,
upon which a court may waive the requirement. 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(3)(A). The ability of
the court to waive the credit counseling requirement is fundamentally inconsistent
with the conclusion that this requirement is subject-matter jurisdictional. Morrison v.
Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (once a court determines that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the court’s sole remaining act is to dismiss the case
for lack of jurisdiction”).
200
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Breaking Down BDC
1. The Second Circuit’s Argument “fails on its own
terms”205

Perhaps one of the biggest weaknesses of the Second
Circuit’s holding in BDC that Section 303(b) is jurisdictional is
its surprisingly superficial reasoning. As the Trusted Net court
pointed out in its first analysis of Section 303(b), the Second
Circuit failed to address the interaction of Section 303(b) with
the other subsections of Section 303 and “ignore[d] the fact that
subject matter jurisdiction turns only upon whether the court
has the statutorily-conferred power to hear the case before it,
and therefore has nothing to do with the speedy determination
of claims or whether an alleged debtor—or any other party—is
‘properly before the . . . court.’”206 To the extent that the Second
Circuit specifically considered the proper characterization of
Section 303(b) and explicitly held that it is jurisdictional in
nature,207 its holding can hardly be called a “drive-by
jurisdictional ruling[].”208 At the same time, it also falls short of
the detailed treatment given by courts that have found Section
303(b) to be nonjurisdictional.209 The BDC court provided only a
summary rationale for its conclusion, stating that “[w]hether
an alleged debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an
involuntary case is a threshold determination that should be
made at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings,” so that
creditors cannot “haul a solvent debtor with whom they have
legitimate disputes into bankruptcy court and force it to defend
an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding while the bankruptcy
court leaves for a later merits determination whether the
debtor is even properly before it.”210 While the propriety of the
involuntary petition is undoubtedly something that should be

205

In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 525 F.3d 1095, 1102 (11th Cir.

2008).
206

Id. at 1102 (quoting In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2003)).
BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118 (“We believe the more sound view is that the
[§ 303(b) undisputed claim] requirement is subject matter jurisdictional, and now so
hold.”).
208
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (quoting Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)).
209
See, e.g., Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1100-04; In re Saunders, 379 B.R. 847,
855-57 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007); In re Earl’s Tire Svc., Inc., 6 B.R. 1019, 1021-23 (D. Del.
1980).
210
BDC 56, 330 F.3d at 118.
207
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resolved as soon as possible,211 labeling Section 303(b) as
jurisdictional allows precisely the opposite to occur since a lack
of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.212 The
BDC court failed to address this issue.
The unworkable nature of the BDC holding became
evident in In re MarketXT Holdings, 213 a 2006 decision by a
bankruptcy court in the Second Circuit. In MarketXT, the court
entered involuntary Chapter 11 relief against a debtor who
failed to file a motion opposing the petition.214 Approximately
six months later, a nonpetitioning creditor sought to have the
case against the debtor dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, alleging that the petitioning creditor’s claim was
subject to a bona fide dispute.215 While maintaining that it was
adhering to the Second Circuit’s ruling that Section 303(b) is
jurisdictional,216 the bankruptcy court nevertheless denied the
creditor’s motion to dismiss, relying on Section 303(d)’s
provision that only the debtor may file an answer to an
involuntary petition.217 Although the court acknowledged the
circuit’s position that Section 303(b) is subject-matter
jurisdictional,218 it simultaneously stripped the provision of two
211

Id.; FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001.
Trusted Net, 525 F.3d at 1102 (“BDC’s rationale also fails on its own terms
. . . [because i]f § 303(b)’s requirements are subject matter jurisdictional, an
involuntary debtor could raise a § 303(b) challenge at any point in the proceedings,
whereas if § 303(b) is non-jurisdictional, § 303(h) and Rule 1013 would require that the
issue of the petitioning creditors’ compliance with § 303(b) be determined at the outsetas a threshold matter-or be forever waived.”). Admittedly, while the nonjurisdictional
approach would put the issue of the petition’s propriety to rest if not raised within a
certain period of time, it would do so at the expense of an actual determination of that
issue. However, there are other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that provide the
debtor with protection against frivolous involuntary petitions, such that it is not
necessary to rely on a jurisdictional reading of § 303(b) to accomplish this goal. See
infra Part III.C.2.
213
347 B.R. 156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
214
Id. at 158.
215
Id. at 158-59.
216
Id. at 160. Interestingly, the MarketXT court failed to even acknowledge
United Marine, LLC v. Just for Windows, Inc., decided one year before BDC, in which
the court recognized that “[t]he weight of the authority clearly supports the holding
that the § 303(b) requirements are not jurisdictional and that the affirmative defense
that a petition does not comply with such requirements may be waived pursuant to
§ 303(h).” No. 01 Civ. 5066(HB), 2002 WL 72933, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002).
In United Marine, the court found that the debtor had waived his right to challenge the
petition based on an insufficient number of petitioning creditors and failure to allege
unsecured claims in the required aggregate amount. Id. at *1.
217
MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160; see 11 U.S.C. § 303(d) (2006) (“The debtor, or a
general partner in a partnership debtor that did not join in the petition, may file an
answer to a petition under this section.”); see also supra Part III.A.2.
218
MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160.
212
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of the most fundamental characteristics of subject matter
jurisdiction—namely, that it can be raised by any party, at any
time, and that when it is lacking, it cannot be conferred by the
actions of the parties or the court.219 The court’s justification
was that this interpretation was necessary to preserve the
function of Section 303(d).220 Interestingly, the court held that
the Second Circuit’s policy of determining “whether an alleged
debtor is properly before the bankruptcy court in an
involuntary proceeding” as early as possible is carried out by
Section 303(h),221 which directs a bankruptcy court to enter
relief against a debtor who fails to controvert an involuntary
petition.222 Accordingly, there should be no need to achieve this
objective by calling Section 303(b) jurisdictional. In fact,
treating it as such would actually undermine the goal of
resolving the propriety of the petition as soon as possible.223
In the end, the only sensible part of the MarketXT
opinion is the outcome.224 It is apparent and well-recognized
that a creditor is not able to move for dismissal of an

219

Id.; see supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the fundamental rules of subject
matter jurisdiction).
220
MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160; see 11 U.S.C. § 303(d). The bankruptcy court
acknowledged that subject matter jurisdiction can be challenged by any party but
stated that this was “no justification for invalidating another part of the same statute
[i.e., § 303(d)].” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160. The court also stated that “[n]othing in
BDC 56 LLC suggests that the jurisdictional aspect of § 303(b) would trump the
command of § 303(h) that an order for relief be entered if the petition is not ‘timely
controverted,’” Id. at 162, indicating that it might also reject a debtor’s motion for
dismissal for a § 303(b) deficiency if it is untimely.
221
Id. at 161-62 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re BDC 56
LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2003)).
222
11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (“If the petition is not timely controverted, the court
shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under
which the petition was filed.”).
223
See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
224
What MarketXT demonstrates is a lower court bound by an unworkable
precedent, that must fashion a coherent argument for its holding from contradictory
authority. In its battle to make sense of BDC’s holding, the bankruptcy court even
misconstrued a passage from a widely recognized authority on bankruptcy when it
stated that “subject matter jurisdiction arises ‘in other contexts under section 303,
most notably subsections (b) and (h).’” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 161 (quoting 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 303.02[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. 2002)).
In fact, that source was referring to the issue addressed in BDC, and went on to
conclude that “[t]he better argument is that the . . . requirements of section 303(b) can
be waived.” COLLIER, supra note 5, ¶ 303.08[3]. Moreover, the MarketXT court also
downplayed the significance of the Supreme Court’s holding in Arbaugh, stating merely
that “in recent decisions the Supreme Court has narrowed the effect of the term
[‘jurisdiction’].” MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 162. Rather than acknowledge that the Second
Circuit improvidently labeled § 303(b) as jurisdictional, the bankruptcy court simply
declined to extend BDC. Id.
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involuntary bankruptcy case.225 However, it remains unclear
how the Second Circuit will respond to a case where the debtor
waits to raise the Section 303(b) defense until after an order for
involuntary bankruptcy relief has been entered. The mere fact
that the outcome of this hypothetical is uncertain points to the
flaws in the circuit’s current approach.226
2. Making Sense of BDC
What makes the Second Circuit’s conclusion in BCD all
the more puzzling is that the determination that Section 303(b)
is subject-matter jurisdictional was unnecessary given the
procedural posture of the case.227 Specifically, the debtor filed a
timely response and therefore could raise affirmative defenses
based on the substantive requirements of Section 303(b),228 thus
making the issue of Section 303(b)’s construction superfluous.229
The circuit court purported to address the issue to determine
the proper standard of appellate review230 when it adopted a
plenary standard of review231 over the more commonly-accepted

225

See, e.g., MarketXT, 347 B.R. at 160 (interpreting § 303(d) to mean that
“only ‘[t]he debtor, or a general partner in a partnership debtor that did not join in the
petition, may file an answer’”) (emphasis added). “A ‘creditor is not authorized to
contest an involuntary petition because a creditor may have an incentive to protect a
preference or to gain some unfair advantage at the expense of other creditors.’” Id.
(quoting In re Westerleigh Dev. Corp., 141 B.R. 38, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992))
(internal alterations omitted); In re Taylor & Assocs., L.P., 191 B.R. 374, 378-79, 381
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (this rule “prohibit[s] creditors from contesting an
involuntary petition in order to prevent creditors from protecting a preference or
retaining some other unfair advantage”); In re New Era Co., 115 B.R. 41, 44-45 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (listing cases in support of this proposition). This interpretation is also
reinforced by FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(a).
226
The two apparent options in such a case are: (1) that the court will apply
the BDC holding that § 303(b) is jurisdictional, and allow the debtor to obtain dismissal
even after entry of relief by showing that the debt is subject to a bona fide dispute; or
(2) that it will distinguish BDC on the grounds that the debtor from BDC moved for
dismissal before entry of relief, and deny dismissal to the untimely debtor. See, e.g.,
United Marine L.L.C. v. Just for Windows, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5066(HB), 2002 WL 72933
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002) (where the court essentially took the latter approach).
Because MarketXT has already demonstrated that BDC’s version of subject matter
jurisdiction allows for exceptions, there is no principled way of predicting what further
exceptions may be made on a case-by-case basis.
227
The debtor answered the involuntary petition within twenty days, as
mandated by FED. R. BANKR. P. 1011(b). Key Mech. Inc. v. BDC 56 LLC, No. 01 Civ.
10169(RWS), 2002 WL 449856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2002); supra note 72.
228
Key Mech., 2002 WL 449856, at *1.
229
See supra note 72.
230
In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2003).
231
Id. at 116-17, 119.
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review for clear error.232 However, if the court’s objective was
simply to apply a more rigorous standard of review than the
clearly erroneous standard, it could have accomplished it
without construing Section 303(b) as subject-matter
jurisdictional.233 In sum, the facts and procedural posture of
BDC simply did not require the court to hold that Section
303(b) is jurisdictional.
The Second Circuit’s concern with the potential
unfairness of involuntary bankruptcy cases is legitimate—
treating Section 303(b) as substantive could lead to the
undesirable result of allowing creditors to force debtors into
bankruptcy on the basis of disputed claims234 because a Section
303(b) deficiency would be an affirmative defense that is
waived if not timely raised.235 However, while the waiver of
affirmative defenses for failure to raise them in a timely
manner arguably leads to unfairness in any circumstance, it
nonetheless is uniformly accepted by the federal courts.236 The
232

See id. at 118 n.3 (collecting cases in which other circuit courts “held that
the clearly erroneous standard of review applies on appeal of a bankruptcy court’s
determination that a bona fide dispute exists.”).
233
The courts that have adopted a per se rule of reviewing a bankruptcy
court’s findings regarding a bona fide dispute for clear error have justified it on the
basis that such a determination “will often depend . . . upon an assessment of
witnesses’ credibilities and other factual considerations.” In re Rimell, 946 F.2d 1363,
1365 (8th Cir. 1991). When facts are in dispute, this approach is proper. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 8013. However, in cases where the facts concerning the claim are not in
dispute, the question of whether there is a “bona fide dispute” under § 303(b) can be
treated as a question of law and given de novo review. See, e.g., In re Dilley, 339 B.R. 1,
5 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (“Although some appellate courts suggest that the existence of
a bona fide dispute is a fact question and thus the clearly erroneous standard always
applies, we decline to adopt a per se rule.”) (footnote omitted). Although the Dilley court
cited BDC for this proposition, it did so without adopting BDC’s holding that § 303(b) is
jurisdictional. Id.
234
See supra note 70.
235
See, e.g., In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC, 550 F.3d 1035, 1037
(11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]e conclude that § 303(b)’s requirements are not subject
matter jurisdictional in nature, and therefore can be waived.”); In re Mason, 709 F.2d
1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the debtor “waived his right to present [a
§ 303(b)] defense by failing to raise it in an answer to the petition”).
236
5 CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1278 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] (“It
is a frequently stated proposition of virtually universal acceptance by the federal courts
that a failure to plead an affirmative defense as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results
in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the case . . . .”); id. at § 1278 n.1
(collecting cases). The purpose of this rule is to provide the plaintiff with “fair notice of
the defense that is being advanced.” Rogers v. McDorman, 521 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The concern is that a defendant
should not be permitted to lie behind a log and ambush a plaintiff with an unexpected
defense.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A bankruptcy pleading
also is subject to the Rule 8 requirements as to the pleading of . . . affirmative
defenses . . . .” FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1229.
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apparent desire of the Second Circuit to protect debtors from
unscrupulous creditors that would use involuntary bankruptcy
as a way to force disputed payments is sensible, but distorting
well-established legal principles is a poor way to achieve it.
In addition, the Bankruptcy Code also provides other
avenues that do not depend upon Section 303(b) being
classified as subject-matter jurisdictional for a debtor to object
to an involuntary petition that threatens to work an injustice.
For example, the debtor can request that the bankruptcy court
abstain from hearing the case on the basis that the parties
would be better served by non-bankruptcy proceedings.237
Alternatively, a debtor that has failed to timely object to an
involuntary petition can move to vacate the order for relief by
showing that it has “a meritorious defense and that arguably
one of the four conditions for relief applies—mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”238 In its evaluation
237

11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (“The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a
case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any
time if . . . the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such
dismissal or suspension . . . .”). The power to abstain under § 305(a) applies to both
voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., In re Mountain Dairies, Inc., 372
B.R. 623, 634-35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Even if [the creditor] were an eligible
petitioner under 11 U.S.C. § 303, this Court would be compelled to abstain pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 305 because this is essentially a two-party dispute for which the parties
have adequate remedies in state court. The bankruptcy court is not a collection
agency.” (internal footnote omitted)); In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A., 303
B.R. 1, 9 n.11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The legislative history of § 305(a)(1) indicates
that Congress had in mind a debtor undertaking a voluntary out-of-court restructuring
and an involuntary case then being ‘commenced by a few recalcitrant creditors to
provide a basis for future threats to extract full payment. The less expensive out-ofcourt workout may better serve the interests of the case.’”) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1977)); In re Spade, 258 B.R. 221, 225-31, 37 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2001) (discussing the showing necessary for a bankruptcy court to abstain from
hearing an involuntary case, collecting cases, and concluding that “a court may
consider any factors it considers to be relevant to the determination of whether a
dismissal of the case or a suspension of all proceedings would better serve the interests
of the creditors and the debtor,” including the debtor’s “legitimate interest in avoiding
the stigma that attaches to those forced into bankruptcy”); In re ABQ-MCP Joint
Venture, 153 B.R. 338, 342 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993) (“A court may properly abstain from
hearing an involuntary bankruptcy case which is essentially a two-party dispute,
where the creditor has adequate state law remedies, and the debtor has no significant
assets for the bankruptcy court to administer.”); In re G-N Partners, 48 B.R. 459, 461
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (“While there may be other situations in which dismissal under
§ 305(a) is appropriate, the one most clearly applicable is that in which an out of court
‘work-out’ has been accomplished or is soon to be accomplished and a few recalcitrant
creditors have filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition.”).
238
In re Hutter Assocs., Inc., 138 B.R. 512, 516 (W.D. Va. 1992) (emphasis and
alterations removed); see also In re High Voltage Eng’g Corp., 360 B.R. 369, 381-82
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (discussing Rule 60(b) requirements in the context of a
bankruptcy case). “[T]here is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and
we therefore view defaults with disfavor.” In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d
1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003) (referring to an involuntary debtor’s Rule 60(b) motion to
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of a motion to vacate an order for relief, the court may consider
the existence of meritorious affirmative defenses based on a
Section 303(b) deficiency.239 Finally, a debtor can object to an
improper claim using the same defenses that would be
available in a typical non-bankruptcy action to collect.240
Consequently, the apparent likelihood that the bankruptcy
court will disallow a legitimately disputed claim should
counteract the incentive of creditors to file involuntary
petitions to coerce the payment of disputed debts. Therefore,
the Bankruptcy Code already incorporates safeguards to
ensure that debtors are not improperly subjected to
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.241
CONCLUSION
While involuntary petitions may be a small percentage
of total bankruptcy cases,242 the proper application of the law is
of the utmost importance to those against whom an involuntary
vacate a default judgment in a bankruptcy case). As the court in Hutter recognized,
“Bankruptcy Rules 7055 (‘Default’) and 9024 (‘Relief from Judgment or Order’) make
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) applicable to [an involuntary] case.” 138 B.R. at 516; see also In re
Paczesny, 282 B.R. 646, 647 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (involuntary relief was entered
after debtor failed to timely answer, but court subsequently granted debtor’s motion to
vacate the order for relief); In re Morris, 115 B.R. 752, 754-55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(vacating order for relief pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(a), where the order was
prematurely entered due to administrative error).
239
See Jet Star Enters. Ltd. v. CS Aviation Servs., No. 01 Civ. 6590(DAB),
2004 WL 350733, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004) (explaining that “the Second Circuit
requires consideration of [affirmative] defenses when ruling on motions to set aside
default judgments”) (citing Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.
1993)).
240
11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (“[I]f [an] objection to a claim is made, the court, after
notice and a hearing . . . shall allow such claim . . . except to the extent that . . . such
claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent
or unmatured . . . .”); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S.
443, 450 (2007) (“[It is a] settled principle that ‘[c]reditors’ entitlements in bankruptcy
arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor’s
obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. . . .’
That principle requires bankruptcy courts to consult state law in determining the
validity of most claims.”) (quoting Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20
(2000)); In re Shaffner, 320 B.R. 870, 876 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) (“Section 502(b)(1)
permits the objecting party to challenge the validity of the claim for any of the myriad
reasons that would arise either under the agreement itself (e.g., the amount owed is
$1,000, not $2,000) or under applicable non-bankruptcy laws (e.g., lack of consideration
or the statute of frauds).”).
241
Additionally, § 303(i) provides that costs and attorney’s fees may be
awarded to a debtor who succeeds in having the involuntary petition dismissed. 11
U.S.C. § 303(i)(1). If the petition was filed in bad faith, this provision also allows the
court to award actual and punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2).
242
See supra note 5.
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petition is commenced. The need for uniform application of the
bankruptcy laws243 suggests that the Second Circuit’s position
in BDC deserves close scrutiny. Although the Bankruptcy
Code’s jurisdictional structure and statutory language provide
sufficient
arguments
against
the
Second
Circuit’s
interpretation
of
Section
303(b)
as
subject-matter
jurisdictional,244 the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Arbaugh245 provides the proverbial nail in the coffin and
illustrates the importance of proper statutory construction on a
scale much larger than just that of the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, it is time for the Second Circuit to confront the
unworkable precedent that it created in BDC and explicitly
hold that Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code does not
pertain to subject matter jurisdiction.
Rachel Green†

243

See, e.g., In re Frushour, 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Uniformity
among the circuits is also important in the bankruptcy context.”); Gonzales v. Parks,
830 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting the importance of “the uniformity of federal
bankruptcy law, a uniformity required by the Constitution”) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The
Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 573 (1993) (“The
unavoidable conclusion is that the Court is much more concerned with ensuring
uniformity in the implementation of federal bankruptcy law than with the content of
such law.”).
244
See supra Part III.
245
See supra Part III.A.3.
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